







Optimizing Inter-operator Network Slicing over
Licensed and Unlicensed Bands
Abstract—Network slicing has been considered as a key
enabling technology for 5G due to its ability to customize and
“slice” a common resource to support diverse services and
verticals. This paper introduces a novel inter-operator network
slicing framework in which multiple mobile network operators
(MNOs) can cooperate and jointly slice their accessible
spectrum resources in both licensed and unlicensed bands. For
the licensed band slicing, we propose the inter-operator spectrum
aggregation method which allows two or more MNOs to
cooperate and share their licensed bands to support a common
set of service types. Since all MNOs enjoy equal rights to access
unlicensed bands, we introduce the concept of right sharing for
MNOs to share and trade their rights to access unlicensed
bands. We develop a modified back-of-the-envelop method for
the MNOs to evaluate their value of rights in unlicensed bands
when coexisting with other wireless technologies. We develop a
network slicing game based on the overlapping coalition
formation game to investigate the possible cooperation between
MNOs. We prove that our proposed game always has at least
one stable slicing structure. We develop a Distributed
Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers with Partially
Variable Splitting (D-ADMM-PVS) algorithm to implement our
proposed framework in a distributed manner. To evaluate the
practical performance of our proposed framework, we develop
a C++-based discrete-event simulator and simulate a possible
implementation of our proposed framework over 400 base
station locations deployed by two primary cellular operators in
a major city in Europe. Numerical results show that our
proposed framework can almost double the capacity for all
supported services for each operator under certain conditions.
Index Terms—Network slicing, spectrum sharing,
inter-operator, unlicensed band, game theory, ADMM.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of mobile technologies and
emerging wireless services, mobile network operators
(MNOs) are experiencing unprecedented growth in wireless
data traffic. To meet the future demand in 5G networks,
MNOs have taken steps to secure more spectrum resources.
The concept of inter-operator spectrum sharing, also referred
to as the co-primary spectrum sharing [1], allows each MNO
to share their licensed bands with each other and therefore
has the potential to significantly increase the spectrum that is
available for each MNO. Both FCC and 3GPP have recently
set forth several initiatives that aim at encouraging spectrum
sharing among MNOs. More specifically, 3GPP Release 14
promotes the idea of radio access network (RAN) sharing
which allows multiple MNOs to share their network
resources including infrastructure, network functions, and
spectrum resources to reduce their system roll-out cost/delay
[2]. FCC also introduced new co-primary shared access rules
for several millimeter wave (mmWave) bands to promote
cooperation and spectrum sharing among spectrum licensees
including Federal governments and MNOs [3]. To further
alleviate the spectrum scarcity for commercial cellular use,
MNOs have been allowed to extend their services to
unlicensed bands including the 5GHz
unlicensed-national-information-infrastructure (U-NII) radio
band [4] as well as the 57-64GHz and 64-71GHz bands
recently opened by FCC [3].
In addition to supporting more traffic, 5G networks are
expected to serve highly heterogenous services with diverse
requirements. Network slicing has been considered as a key
enabler for 5G, due to its ability to create logical partitions
of a common resource. These partitions, known as the
network slices, can be orchestrated and customized
according to different service requirements. Network slicing
has the potential to significantly improve spectrum efficiency
and enable more flexible and novel services that cannot
otherwise be supported by the existing network architecture.
Allowing multiple MNOs to jointly slice their shared
resources in both licensed and unlicensed bands has the
following benefits: 1) The spectrum resource that is available
to each type of services is now significantly expanded,
resulting in increased capabilities to support ultra-high-speed
and low-latency services over large bandwidths, 2) It is
known that cellular traffic of different operators exhibits
significant temporal and spatial variations [5]. Allowing
operators to cooperate and compensate each other according
to different service demands and requirements would not
only improve the spectrum utilization but would also
increase their revenues [6], 3) Recent observation showed
that the potential inter-operator interference and channel
collisions resulting from the selfish behavior of MNOs could
result in significant performance degradation for all MNOs.
By allowing some MNOs to relinquish their access rights of
an unlicensed band to other MNOs in exchange for some
forms of compensation, e.g., monetary exchange or a similar
treatment in other bands, can reduce contention, improve the
spectrum utilization, and increase service reliability.
One key challenge in inter-operator network slicing that
remains relatively unexplored is the problem of efficient
resource allocation over both licensed and unlicensed bands.
Licensed and unlicensed bands exhibit different
characteristics and require different mechanisms for spectrum
access. In particular, a licensed band is typically allocated to
an MNO for exclusive use. Each MNO has already carefully
planned its network infrastructure and adopted various
centrally controlled resource scheduling and allocation
mechanisms to ensure optimal utilization and reliable service
support for its user equipments (UEs). The unlicensed band,
on the other hand, is open to all wireless technologies. To
reduce contention between coexisting systems, current Wi-Fi
standards as well as the recently published licensed-assisted
access (LAA) protocol rely on a carrier-sense multiple
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access (CSMA)-based channel access mechanism called
listen-before-talk (LBT). In this mechanism, both LAA and
Wi-Fi transmitters must first sense the channel and can only
access it when it is sensed idle. The uncertainty for the
channel access in unlicensed bands makes it difficult to
support services that require stringent quality-of-service
(QoS) guarantees. Therefore, most existing works on
network slicing focused on licensed bands. In addition,
unlike the licensed band in which MNOs can coordinate and
share their exclusively licensed spectrum resources, all
MNOs have equal rights to access unlicensed bands. How to
share and jointly slice the unlicensed band resources among
MNOs is still an open problem.
In this paper, we address the above challenges by
designing a novel framework that allows multiple MNOs to
jointly divide and share licensed and unlicensed spectrum
resources according to the service demands and requirements
of their UEs. For licensed band slicing, we propose an
inter-operator spectrum aggregation method to allow
multiple MNOs to share their licensed band resources. In
this method, each MNO divides its licensed band into
partitions each of which will be distributed to support a
specific type of service. Multiple MNOs can cooperate with
each other by aggregating their distributed licensed bands to
support the same type of service. We introduce the concept
of right sharing to investigate the inter-operator cooperation
in unlicensed bands. In this concept, each MNO will first
quantify the benefit that can be obtained in unlicensed bands,
referred to as the value of rights. MNOs can then negotiate
and trade their rights to access unlicensed bands according to
the estimated value. We propose a modified
back-of-the-envelop (mBoE) method for each MNO to
estimate its value of rights as well as the potential value
improvement that can be achieved when one or more other
MNOs are willing to give up their rights to access
unlicensed bands. We observe that if each MNO has been
given the choice to slice both licensed or unlicensed bands,
the interaction between MNOs can be very complex. For
example, if an MNO cannot secure enough resource in the
licensed band, it will become more aggressive in unlicensed
bands and would like to pay more for the rights of other
MNOs. Similarly, if the licensed band can offer sufficient
resources to support the required traffic of some MNOs,
these MNOs will be more willing to sell their right in
unlicensed bands. To investigate the interaction among
MNOs, we develop a network slicing game based on
overlapping coalition formation game. In this game, MNOs
can jointly decide the resource allocation as well as
distribution of the utility obtained in each network slice. A
network slicing structure can only result in a stable state
when no MNO can benefit from unilaterally deviating from
this structure. It is known that analyzing an overlapping
coalition formation game is notoriously difficult. In
particular, such a game does not always have a stable
structure. Furthermore, allowing overlaps between coalitions
results in infinitely many possible structures which makes
exhaustive search-based methods, that are widely used in
traditional partition-based coalition formation game,
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Fig. 1. Inter-operator network slicing over licensed and unlicensed bands.
impossible to apply. We prove that our proposed network
slicing game always has at least one stable structure. In
addition, we develop a novel Distributed Alternating
Direction Method of Multipliers with Partial Variable
Splitting (D-ADMM-PVS) algorithm to implement our
proposed network slicing in a distributed manner. We prove
that our proposed algorithm can approach the stable and
optimal network slicing structure in linear time without
requiring the back-and-forth communication among MNOs.
To evaluate the practical performance of our proposed
framework, we develop a C++-based discrete-event
simulation environment using CSIM development toolkit [7].
We simulate a possible implementation of our proposed
framework over 400 base stations (BSs) deployed by two
primary cellular network operators in a major city in Europe.
Our numerical results show that our proposed framework can
almost double the capacity for all supported services for
each operator even when only two operators can cooperate
with each other.
II. RELATED WORKS
Most existing works on inter-operator spectrum sharing
focus on licensed band sharing between MNOs with similar
traffics and volumes of licensed spectrum resources. More
specifically, METIS’ future spectrum system concept
suggests two co-primary shared access scenarios: limited
spectrum pooling (LSP) and mutual renting (MR) [8]. In
LSP, two or more MNOs contribute part of their licensed
spectrum to form a common pool. All contributing MNOs
have equal rights to access the pool and should follow a
mutually agreed rule to access the pooled resource. MR
allows each MNO to temporally license part or all of its
spectrum to another operator. Different from LSP that is
equally shared among all the operators, each operator in MR
can maintain its strict priority in its own licensed band.
Inter-operator resource sharing has also been studied from
the network slicing perspective. In [9], a resource allocation
mechanism called the Fisher market has been used to study
the resource allocation across slices. In [10], a
signaling-based network slicing broker solution has been
proposed to achieve accurate traffic prediction, slice
scheduling, as well as admission control.
Compared to the inter-operator resource sharing in licensed
bands, the sharing of unlicensed bands is more complicated. In
[11], the authors studied the scenarios that the unlicensed band
has been divided into several portions among multiple MNOs.
A spectrum sharing scheme was proposed to allow spectrum
borrowing and lending among MNOs. Motivated by the recent
observations that Wi-Fi and LTE coexistence in the unlicensed
band could result in 70% or even 100% throughput degradation
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for the Wi-Fi systems in the worst case, most existing works
focus on developing mechanisms to ensure fair coexistence
between LTE and Wi-Fi [12].
III. NETWORK SLICING FRAMEWORK DESIGN
The main objective of this paper is to design an
inter-operator network slicing framework which allows two
or more MNOs to jointly slice their accessible spectrum
resources to support a common set of Y types of services
labeled as Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y }. Our framework extends from
the 3GPP’s active network sharing management architecture
introduced in 3GPP Release 14 [2]. In this architecture, a
master operator (MOP) collects the global information and
manage the allocation of the shared radio resource among
participating operators (POPs) via the MOP’s network
manager (MOP-NM). However, this centralized management
approach cannot be directly applied to inter-operator network
slicing due to the following reasons: 1) in 3GPP’s
architecture, MOP monitors and controls a fixed amount of
resource shared among a fixed set of POPs. However, in
practice, different MNOs can have different demands and
requirements of different services. Each MNO may like to
cooperate with different subsets of MNOs to support
different types of services. 2) 3GPP’s architecture only
allows sharing of licensed band resources among MNOs.
Compared to the licensed bands, unlicensed bands are free
and contain much wider bandwidth of spectrum for MNOs
to access. Unfortunately, unlicensed bands require different
spectrum access mechanism and therefore the licensed band
slicing method cannot be extended into unlicensed bands. 3)
Allowing the MOP to always collect global information from
POPs may result in network congestion and intolerably high
latency caused by information collection as well as potential
disclosure of proprietary information of POPs.
To address the above issues, this paper introduces a
distributed framework in which each MNO decides how
much spectrum resource to be distributed for each type of
service (service instance) as well as whether to share the
distributed resource with other MNOs as illustrated in Figure
1. In our framework, MNOs are self-interested and will only
cooperate when an agreement has been reached and mutually
agreed among all slices. Our proposed framework jointly
optimizes the resource slicing among MNOs according to
different service demands and requirements taking into
account the different resources and channel access
mechanisms in licensed and unlicensed bands.
IV. INTER-OPERATOR NETWORK SLICING
A. Network Slicing for Licensed Bands
We consider a wireless network consisting of a set of M
MNOs, labeled as M = {1, 2, . . . ,M}, that offer services
through their network infrastructures, e.g., base stations (BSs).
Each MNO is allocated a licensed band Bi for exclusive use.
Each MNO can support a set of Y types of service for each
of its UEs Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y }. Each type of service requires a
specific minimum QoS guarantee. In this paper, we consider
systems with saturated traffic such that each UE can always
generate saturated traffic for all supported service types. Let
ηli be the minimum throughput that needs to be guaranteed for
type l service at every UE of MNO i.
Each MNO i can divide its licensed band into a set of
subcarriers each of which can be allocated to support the
traffic for a particular type of service. Generally speaking,
the bandwidth of each subcarrier is much smaller than that
of the entire licensed band. We can therefore assume the
licensed band is continuously dividable among different
types of service. Each MNO can divide and aggregate the
contiguous and uncontiguous parts of the licensed band to
support different services within each MNO using the carrier
aggregation technique adopted in existing LTE standards.
Instead of allocating its own licensed band, each MNO
can also negotiate with other MNOs to form a group for
possible sharing of the licensed bands. We refer a group of
MNOs that decide to share their licensed bands with each
other to support type l service as a service support group
(SSG) denoted as Cl for Cl ⊆ M. Generally speaking,
MNOs are self-interested. We therefore assume that each
member MNO can evaluate its benefit obtained by
cooperating with others and will only form an SSG with
others when every member MNO can improve its benefit and
also be allocated with a fair sharing of the total utility. The
MNOs in an SSG will jointly decide the portion of spectrum
resource allocated to the supported service. The spectrum
sharing among multiple member MNOs within an SSG can
be coordinated by adopting the management architecture for
the multiple operator core network (MOCN) specified by
3GPP [2], [13]. In particular, MNOs can jointly decide the
spectrum division through the dynamic spectrum
management (DSM) block and consult the external spectrum
databases for resource distribution.
We introduce the inter-operator spectrum aggregation for
MNOs associated with the same SSG to share their licensed
band resources for each commonly supported service type l.
Let wli be the portion of licensed band distributed by MNO i
to support the lth type of service. We have 0 ≤ wli ≤ Bi.
MNOs in Cl will aggregate their allocated licensed bands for
type l service traffic. We can write the total aggregated
licensed spectrum allocated by MNOs to support type l




i. Each UE associated with a
member MNO within an SSG will follow a mutually agreed
scheduling procedure to access the aggregated spectrum. The
final portion of aggregated spectrum that can be accessed by
each UE will depend on the specific network topology as
well as traffic from other nearby UEs. Let Li be the set of
all the communication links associated with UEs of MNO i.
We can write dlk,i as the portion of w
l that can be accessed
by the kth communication link (e.g., uplink or downlink
from each UE or BS) to send data traffic corresponding to
type l service, i.e., the total spectrum that can be accessed
by each link k of MNO i is given by dlk,iw
l. We can write
the utility obtained by MNO i for serving type l service at







i is the price per
data bit charged by MNO i by serving type l service and
Rk,i = log2 (1 + SNRk,i) is the throughput per unit (Hz)
achieved by link k of MNO i to support type l service and
SNRk,i is the received signal-to-noise ratio for link k when
it is the only link to access the channel.
If MNOs can only perform network slicing by jointly
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sharing their licensed bands, we can write the optimization











wli ≤ Bi and dlk,iRk,i
∑
i∈Cl
wli ≥ ηli, (1b)
where wi = 〈wli〉l∈Y is the distribution of the licensed band
resources decided by MNO i.
Our proposed framework can be directly implemented in the
co-primary spectrum shared access in METIS’ future spectrum
system concept with LSP mode [1]. In particular, if MNOs in
an SSG decide to operate in the LSP, all the member MNOs
will negotiate for a group license and use the inter-operator
carrier aggregation strategy to form a common resource pool
wl to support type l service.
B. Network Slicing for Unlicensed Band
In this subsection, we introduce the right sharing framework
between MNOs in unlicensed bands.
1) LAA Protocol: Before we discuss the inter-operator
spectrum sharing in unlicensed bands, let us first briefly
review the CSMA-based LAA protocol. Since the unlicensed
band is open to all wireless technologies, to avoid the
collision and cross-interference, data transmission is required
to follow a LBT-based channel access mechanism. In this
mechanism, each UE or BS must first sense the vacancy of
the channel for a duration of time called distributed
inter-frame spacing (DIFS) plus a random number, referred
to as the backoff counter number, of time slots. The value of
the backoff counter is uniformly randomly generated
between 0 and an integer value called contention window
CW . The backoff counter is decremented one-by-one for
each time slot till zero when the channel is idle. In case that
the channel is occupied by other neighboring UE or BS. The
backoff counter will be frozen until the channel is sensed to
be idle again. Data packets can only be sent if the channel is
idle during both DIFS and backoff time.
As observed from the above description, it is generally
impossible to guarantee the availability of resources in the
unlicensed band, e.g., even the probability of channel access
is high, there is still a small chance that an LTE UE or BS
cannot send any data packet on the unlicensed band. Let ξk,i
be the probability of channel access for the kth link
associated MNO i. Let Bu be the total amount of spectrum
resource of the unlicensed band.
2) Estimation of Probability of Access in Unlicensed Band:
Before negotiating with other MNOs, an MNO needs to first
pre-evaluate the potential benefit that can be obtained in the
unlicensed band. It also needs to identify whether to negotiate
with one or more other MNOs for the possibility of giving up
their rights in the unlicensed band. Similarly, once an MNO
receives a request from another MNO about giving up its right
to access the unlicensed band, it needs to know how much
damage it will cause and how much compensation it should
expect from the requesting MNOs. In this paper, we assume
the benefit for each MNO in unlicensed bands is closely related
to its probability of the channel access for each of its UEs.
TABLE I
WI-FI AND LAA CHANNEL ACCESS PARAMETERS [15]
DIFS CWmin CWmax TXOP
802.11ac 34 ms 3 7 1.504ms
LAA 25 ms 3 7 2 msec
We introduce an mBoE method for each MNO to
pre-evaluate the probability of access for each of its links.
The basic idea is to generate a graphical model that can
characterize the possible contention among all the intra- and
inter-operator channel contentions as well as the channel
contentions from other coexisting wireless technologies such
as Wi-Fi. Our mBoE method is extended from the original
back-of-the-envelop (BoE) method introduced in [14]. BoE
is a simple and effective method that can quickly calculate
the probability of access of a contention graph without
requiring any detailed information about locations and
transmission parameters.
Unfortunately, the original BoE cannot be directly applied
into LAA system due to the following reasons: 1) the original
BoE method was built on a homogeneous 802.11 network in
which all the devices have the same contention parameters. In
our system, the LAA BSs and UEs coexist with other wireless
technologies such as Wi-Fi, 2) the BoE method needs to have a
complete contention graph consisting of all the communication
links and the calculation of each link requires to consult the
entire network topology. However, in our muti-MNO system,
each MNO cannot know the relative locations of UEs or BSs
associated with other MNOs. To address these two issues, our
mBoE is built on an empirical table consisting of the pre-
measured probability of access of each LAA BS or UE when
contending with different subsets of Wi-Fi and/or other LAA
devices under different network topologies. Compared to the
original BoE method, our mBoE method provides an improved
estimation results with reduced computation complexity. In
addition, our mBoE can calculate the probability of access for
each local link using only the local network topology.
Before we introduce the detailed method, let us introduce
the following assumptions. Note that these assumptions are
only used for justifying the mBoE method and are not
necessary for our network slicing game or distribution
algorithms introduced later in the paper.
A1) Each UE or BS of one MNO can sense the coexistence
of the neighboring UEs and BSs from other MNOs as
well as Wi-Fi devices,
A2) The time duration for random backoff countdown is
negligible, compared to the duration spent on data
transmission,
A3) The distributions for the long-term residual backoff
countdown time and transmission time are stationary.
Assumption A1) is reasonable because LAA protocol has
different contention/transmission parameters compared to
other wireless technologies operated in unlicensed band such
as the Wi-Fi (See Table I for a list of transmission
parameters of LAA release 13 [15] and 802.11ac Wi-Fi
standard). Each UE and BS can monitor the transmission
duration of the data packets from other neighboring devices
and differentiate Wi-Fi devices, LAA UEs and BSs from
other MNOs. Note that the channel fading and shadowing
effects may result in the existence of the so called “hidden
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nodes”, i.e., some BSs or UEs cannot always successfully
detect their neighboring devices. Since our mBoE method is
built on an empirical probability of access table obtained
from previous measurements, the effect of the hidden nodes
has already been reflected in the measuring results. The
impact of the hidden nodes can be further reduced by
allowing MNOs to share their sensing results with each
other. Each MNO can also extract the local information
about channel contenting Wi-Fi devices from the beacon
signal broadcasted by Wi-Fi APs to further improve its
sensing accuracy. Assumption A2) follows the same
observation in [14]. In particular, the countdown time of
different links may occur concurrently which in some sense
cancels the time spent on resolving the possible collisions
among channel contending links. We implement the most
recent LAA specification in [15] into our CSIM-based
simulator and our experimental results also verify this
observation. In other words, the backoff mechanism
introduced in the CSMA protocols can successfully avoid the
collision among contending devices for most of the time and
therefore in most of our measuring results, the data
transmission time dominates the channel access time.
Assumption 3) has been proved in [16].
The first step of mBoE method is to establish a contention
graph that can capture all the contention between the
coexisting devices for each MNO. We formally define
contention graph as follows.
Definition 1: A contention graph for a multi-MNO cellular
system coexisted in the unlicensed band is a graph G = 〈V , E〉
comprising a set V of vertices corresponding to the set of all
the coexisting links connecting UEs and BSs associated with
all the MNOs as well as the coexisting Wi-Fi links and a set E
of edges each of which connects two vertices that can sense the
existence of each other. We also define the contention subgraph
associated with MNO i as the subgraph Gi of G comprising
subsets of vertices and edges corresponding to communication
links associated with MNO i as well as their sensed entities
from other MNOs and Wi-Fi systems.
In Figure 2, we have listed the measured average
probability of access under different contention topologies
using our developed CSIM-based simulator. Note that since
the LAA Release 13 only supports downlink transmission in
unlicensed bands, the number of possible contention
graphical topologies that involves each BS should be limited,
e.g., if all the LAA transmitters correspond to BSs deployed
by MNOs, the maximum number of BSs contending with
each other in each local area will be equivalent to the
number of MNOs. In addition, as observed in many existing
results that as the number of channel contending devices
becomes large, the probability of channel access will drop
significantly. Therefore, it is unnecessary for each UE or BS
to maintain a table that includes a large number of
coexisting devices.
Note that in Figure 2 we observe a significant drop on the
probability of access for Wi-Fi APs in our results presented.
This is because we have adopted the most recent LAA
specification in Table I in which the LAA BS has a shorter
DIFS waiting time as well as longer TXOP transmission
(0.064, 0.906, 0.022)
Contention
graph Probability of access
(0.976, 0.015)
(0.496, 0.001, 0.487)
(0.329, 0.326, 0.001, 0.328)
LAA BS        Wi-Fi AP
Fig. 2. Table of contention subgraphs and the corresponding probability of
access measured by our CSIM simulator.
duration compared to the parameters specified in 802.11ac
standard. Our observation is similar to that reported in [16].
We also define the maximum independent set for an MNO
i as follows:
Definition 2: An independent set associated with MNO i is
a set of vertices in Gi in which no two of which are adjacent.
A maximum independent set for MNO i is an independent set
of largest possible size for graph Gi.
The maximum independent sets can be found by standard
approaches in polynomial time [17].
One of the main idea behind the above procedure is that
the maximum independent sets dominate the possible channel
contention as well as channel access among all the entities
from different MNOs in the same coverage area. In particular,
the following proposition has been proved in [14].
Proposition 1: [14, Propositions 1] A CSMA-based system
spends most of its time in the maximum independent sets and
very little time in other states.
We can write the vector for the probability of access for all
links associated with MNO i as ξi = 〈ξk,i〉k∈Li .
Each MNO can then use the following procedure to estimate
the probability of access for each of its links:
P1) Establish a contention subgraph Gi in the unlicensed band
using the sensing results from all the corresponding UEs
and BSs of MNO i,
P2) Each MNO i can then identify the possible maximum
independent sets for Gi using standard approaches,
P3) Each MNO i generates a modified subgraph G′i by
removing all the vertices that are not associated with
any maximum independent set from Gi,
P4) Each MNO i searches for the probability of channel
access ξk,i for each link k from the pre-stored
contention subgraph table.
Since each MNO can detect the contention from other
MNOs, it can also estimate the possible improvement of the
channel access probability if one or more other MNOs stop
accessing the unlicensed band. We define the estimated
contention subgraph Gi\j for MNO i when MNO j stops
accessing the unlicensed band as the subgraph of Gi such
that all vertices associated with links from MNO j are
removed for i = j. By replacing graph Gi with subgraph
Gi\j in procedure P1), MNO i can estimate the resulting
probability of channel access ξk,i\j for each of its links
following procedures P2) to P4). We write the vector of
channel access probabilities for all the links associated with
MNO i when MNO j stops accessing the unlicensed band as
ξi\j = 〈ξk,i\j〉k∈Li for i = j.
We have verified the estimated probability of access
calculated from the procedures P1)–P4) using our developed
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CSIM simulator under different network topologies in [18].
Please see our technical report in [18] for more detailed
justification of our proposed mBoE method.
3) Inter-operator Right Sharing: As mentioned previously,
the performance degradation of an MNOs for giving up its
right to access the unlicensed band should be compensated
by all the other MNOs that are benefit from the reduction
of channel contention. A mutual agreement must be reached
by the right-giving-up MNOs and the MNOs that are willing
to provide compensations. Let D be the set of MNOs that are
willing to give up their rights to access the unlicensed band for
D ⊂ M. How to divide the utility between the right-giving-
up MNOs and the rest of the MNOs depends on the detailed
requirements and utility improvement that can be achieved by
each MNO. In this paper, we employ a transferrable utility
framework in which the utility obtained by the MNOs in the
unlicensed band can be freely transferred between different
member MNOs. We will give a more detailed description about
this framework in the next section.
From the previous discussion, the unlicensed band resources
that can be accessed by the kth link of MNO i is specified
by the probability of channel access ξk,i\D. Each MNO can
then distribute the channel access at each link according to the
QoS of the supported types of services. Let αlk,i be the portion
of the channel access probability that is allocated to support





ξk,i\D. We also write αi = 〈αlk,i〉k∈Li,l∈Y . We can write the
utility obtained by MNO i from supporting type l service at
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αlk,i = ξk,i\D and α
l
k,iB
uRk,i ≥ ηli, ∀k ∈ Li.
C. Network Slicing over Licensed and Unlicensed Bands
It can be observed that the network slicing decision made
by each MNO in the licensed and unlicensed bands can be
closely related to each other. In particular, if an MNO cannot
secure enough spectrum resource in the licensed band, it will
become more aggressive in the unlicensed band and would
like to pay more for the right of other MNOs. Similarly, if
the licensed band can offer sufficient resources to support the
required traffic of some MNOs, these MNOs will be more
willing to sell their right in the unlicensed band.
The main objective for each MNO is to carefully decide
the resource distributed in both licensed and unlicensed
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u)Rk,i ≥ ηli. (3c)
V. NETWORK SLICING GAME
To model the network slicing problem among multiple
MNOs, we use the framework of the overlapping coalition
formation game. The overlapping coalition formation game
attracts much attention recently due to its capability to
investigate the resource allocation problem between multiple
players that can allocate different portions of their resources
to simultaneously support different services as members of
different coalitions [19]. Compared to the traditional
partition-based coalition formation game, allowing players to
interaction with each other across multiple coalitions has the
potential to further improve the resource utilization efficiency
and increase the outcome for the players.
We formally define network slicing game as follows.
Definition 3: A network slicing game is defined by the tuple
A = 〈M,B,Y,〉 where M is a set of MNOs that are the
players of the game, B = ∪i∈MBi × Bu is the spectrum
resources that can be accessed by each MNO in both licensed
and unlicensed band, Y is the set of service types for each
MNO to distribute resources,  is the vector of utilities that
can be obtained by the MNOs.
We give a more detailed discussion for each of the above
elements in the network slicing game as follows. Each MNO
can access resources in both licensed and unlicensed bands.
The licensed band that can be accessed by each MNO
includes both its own licensed band as well as the licensed
bands owned by other MNOs that can be potentially
aggregated by the MNO. Each MNO can also access the
resources in the unlicensed band through channel contention.
The main objective for MNOs is to slice the available
resource to support all types of service. Each type l of
service is specified by a threshold ηli which characterizes the
minimum QoS that should be guaranteed by each MNO i
and a price ρli describing the unit price charged by MNOs
for supporting the service. A slice cl is a vector
cl = 〈cl1, cl2, . . . , clM 〉 where cli is the resource allocated by
MNO i to support type l service. Each slice comprises of
spectrum resources from the licensed and unlicensed band.
The licensed band resource distributed to support type l
service is given by wl = 〈wli〉i∈Cl . Each MNO can also
access the unlicensed band with a certain probability of
access. The unlicensed band resource distributed to support
type l service can be written as αl = 〈αlk,i〉k∈Li,i∈M.
αlk,i = 0 means that MNO i does not allocate any unlicensed
band resource to support type l service for link k. We define
a network slicing structure c = 〈cl〉l∈Y as a vector
specifying the resource allocations for all the MNOs among
all types of service.
We consider a game with transferrable utility in which the
utility obtained in a slice can be freely transferred among
member MNOs. A characterization function maps each slice
of MNOs into a single value referred to as the worth of a
slice. The worth characterizes the total utility that is
available to all the contributing MNOs. The worth for each
slice consists of utilities obtained from both licensed and










lk,i where supp is the support.
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) ≥ v (cl′) for any cl, cl′ such that cli ≥ cl′i for all i ∈
M. In other words, MNOs will always use all the accessible
resources to serve the supported service.
We define an allocation of utility for each slice as xl =
〈xli〉i∈supp(cl) which describes the worth distributed among all








. xl is also
called imputation if it is efficient and satisfies the individual




where ċli is the slice for type l
service if MNO i did not cooperate with another other MNOs
in both licensed and unlicensed bands. We refer to a network
slicing agreement as a tuple 〈c,x〉 where x = 〈xl〉l∈Y .
As mentioned earlier, MNOs are self-interest entities and
always seek to maximize their individual utilities by forming
coalitions with different MNOs in both licensed and
unlicensed bands. However, the resource distribution and
negotiation among MNOs across different slices can be very
complex. For example, when an MNO negotiating with
another MNO for sharing their resources to serve a specific
type of service, it can also offer a certain term that may
affect the cooperation with other MNOs in serving other
types of service. Similarly, when an MNO deviates from a
network slicing agreement with another MNO in serving a
specific type of service, it can also affect its cooperation
with other MNOs in other service types. The main solution
concept in the network slicing game is the core. We extend
the concept of the conservative core in the overlapping
coalition formation game into our network slicing game.
Definition 4: Given a network slicing game
A = 〈M,B,Y,〉 and a subset of MNOs N ⊆ M.
Suppose 〈c,x〉 and 〈c′,x′〉 are two network slicing
agreements such that for any slice cl ∈ c either
supp(cl) ⊆ N or supp(cl) ⊆ M \ N . We say that network
slicing agreement 〈c′,x′〉 is a profitable deviation of N from
〈c,x〉 if for all j ∈ N , we have j (c′,x′) > j (c,x). We
say that a network slicing agreement 〈c,x〉 is in the core of
A if no subset of N has a profitable deviation from it. In
other words, for any subsets of MNOs N ⊆ M, any network
slicing structure cN , and any imputation x′, we have
j (c
′,x′) ≤ j (c,x).
We have the following result.
Theorem 1: The core of the network slicing game is
non-empty and any outcome in the core maximizes the
social welfare.
Proof: See technical report [18] for the proof.
VI. DISTRIBUTED OPTIMIZATION
One of the main challenges for the inter-operator spectrum
sharing is to minimize the communication overhead between
MNOs. In this section, we propose a simple and distributed
algorithm framework that can achieve the stable and optimal
network slicing structure that is in the core. Our algorithm is
based on the distributed ADMM [20] algorithm to
decompose the optimization problem into a set of
subproblems. Unfortunately, it is known that the traditional
ADMM method can only solve problems consisting of two
blocks of random variables and therefore cannot be directly
applied to solve problem (3) consisting of a large number of
variables. In addition, the original ADMM method is a
centralized approach that requires all players to reveal their
private information to a central controller. Most existing
distributed ADMM methods focused on designing a
consensus mechanism in which the neighboring agents can
exchange and jointly update a local copy of their model
parameters [21]. These methods cannot be directly applied to
solve network slicing problem in inter-operator systems
because MNOs are generally unwilling to share their private
proprietary information with each other.
We propose a D-ADMM-PVS algorithm to optimize the
network slicing for inter-operator systems. In our algorithm
framework, the inter-operator network slicing problem is first
divided into
∑
i∈M |Li| number of sub-problems each of
which can be solved by an individual link (can be either UE
or BS of the corresponding link) of an MNO using its local
information. Each link will submit a single dual variable to
its associated MNO and all the MNO will only coordinate
their collected dual variable using a linear function.
As observed in Section V, the property of transferrable
utility makes MNOs have the incentive to jointly slice their
resources and maximize the total social welfare. Let us write
the social welfare maximization problem for the network





















u)Rk,i  ηi, (4c)
0 ≤ αlk,i ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ wli ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ M, (4d)
where α = 〈αk,i〉k∈Li,i∈M, αk,i = 〈αlk,i〉l∈Y , and
w = 〈wi〉i∈M, wi = 〈wli〉l∈Y , ηi = 〈ηli〉l∈Y is vector of the
minimum QoS required by type l service supported by MNO
i, and  is the vector inequality.
Note that in problem (4), we replace supp(cl) with the set
of all the MNOs M. This does not impact our results because
the utility division among MNOs in each slice has already
been decided by dlk,i. In other words, even if, due to the limit
of the resources, some MNOs choose to not distribute any
licensed resource to support a certain type of services (e.g.,
type l service), this does not mean these MNOs cannot receive
benefit from serving type l services for its UEs because they
can still access the spectrum resource wl distributed by other


























can rewrite the objective function in (4a) as the summation




fk,i(αk,i) + g(w). (5)
Let us introduce a set of indicator functions to incorporate
constraints (4b) into the objective function. For the separable
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constraints (4b), we have
Iαk,i(αk,i) =
{
0, αk,i ∈ Eαk,i,
∞, αk,i /∈ Eαk,i,
, Iw(w) =
{
0, w ∈ Ew,










wli ≤ Bi, 0 ≤ wli ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ M}, (8)
and we can incorporate them into objective functions as
follows:
f+k,i(αk,i) = fk,i(αk,i) + Iαk,i, g+(w) = g(w) + Iw(w). (9)
For the inseparable constraint (4c), we also introduce an
indicator function as follows
IZ(X) =
{
0, X ∈ EZ ,
∞, X /∈ EZ ,
, (10)





u)Rk,i  ηi}. (11)




F (X) + IZ(Z), (12a)
s.t. X −Z = 0, (12b)








is the auxiliary variable introduced to isolate the inseparable
constraint. The augmented Lagrangian of problem (12) is




where ϑ > 0 is the augmented Lagrangian parameter, and Λ is
the dual variable. We can then follow the same line as standard












‖ X(t+1) −Z +Λ(t) ‖22,
(14b)
Λ(t+1) = Λ(t) +X(t+1) −Z(t+1), (14c)
where we use superscript (t) to denote the tth iteration.
To solve the above problem in a distributed manner, we split
variable X into a set of sub-vectors, namely αk,i and wi. We
also separate the X-updating step into a set of sub-problems
as follows.
Each link k solves the following αk,i-subproblem for








‖ αk,i −Z(t)k,i +Λ(t)k,i ‖22;
(15)









Fig. 3. Distribution of BSs for two
cellular MNOs.



















Fig. 4. Convergence performance
of Algorithm 1.
MNOs will jointly solve the following w-subproblem for
licensed band resource distribution through DSM function






‖ w −Z(t)w +Λ(t)w ‖22; (16)
A coordinator deployed in the DSM block is responsible for
coordinating the Z-updating in (14b) and the Λ-updating in
(14c). We summarize the details of the proposed algorithm in
Algorithm 1. The convergence rate is presented in Theorem 2.
Algorithm 1 D-ADMM-PVS Algorithm
Initialization: α0 , w0 , γ > 0, t=1;
for t = 1, 2, ... do








to the corresponding MNO i;
2. MNOs collect the intermediate results α
(t+1)
k,i
from their UEs and/or BSs, and report them to the coordinator.
3. The coordinator executes the following steps:
3a) Sequentially update w, Z and Λ by following (16),(14b) and (14c);
3b) Feedback the auxiliary variables Z·,i and the dual variables Λ·,i to the corresponding MNO i;
4. MNO i feedbacks auxiliary variable Zk,i and dual variable Λk,i to the UE or BS corresponding to link k.
if Stopping criteria meets then
break;
end if
t = t + 1
end for
We can prove the following result.
Theorem 2: The augmented Lagrangian form of the
objective function for problem (12a) is separable and convex.
Algorithm 1 maximizes the social welfare.
Proof: See technical report [18] for the proof.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We develop a C++-based discrete event simulator using
the CSIM development toolkit [7] with total 3000+ lines of
codes to simulate the scheduling and contention behavior
between MNOs as well as that between the LAA system and
Wi-Fi devices over licensed and unlicensed bands. We
simulate the possible implementation of our proposed
inter-operator network slicing framework over 400 BSs
(including GSM and UMTS BSs) deployed by two primary
cellular MNOs in one of the major cities in Europe. The
locations and coverage areas of BSs deployed by both
MNOs are presented in Figure 3. We consider two types of
services (e.g., video and audio streaming) requiring 10 Mbps
and 20 Mbps minimum guaranteed throughput. We present
more simulation results in our technical report [18].
We first compare the convergence performance of Algorithm
1 with other existing approaches for our simulated system in
Figure 4. We can observe that Algorithm 1 can converge to the
optimal network slicing solution within the first few iterations
(less than 14 iterations in both cases). We also present the
convergence rate when a centralized ADMM in [20] can be
implemented to control the network slicing in a centralized
9


















Fig. 5. Traffic admitted by each
slice under different network densities.


















Fig. 6. Traffic admitted by
network slicing.
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Fig. 7. Traffic admitted by each
slice under different min throughput
guarantees.
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Fig. 8. Traffic admitted by
network slicing under different min
throughput guarantees.
fashion. In this case, a centralized controller (deployed in a
shared radio access network according to 3GPP specification)
can collect all the information from all the MNOs and calculate
resource distribution for each slice among all the MNOs. It
can be easily observed that this implementation will result
in a large communication overhead between MNOs. We can
observe that our proposed Algorithm 1 presents a very similar
convergence performance as the centralized approach and can
approach a neighborhood of the optimal solution within first 2
iterations which is much faster than the subgradient method.
We consider 9 regions from the rural areas to the city
center with different BS deployment densities to evaluate the
impact of the network density on the performance of network
slicing. The decrease of the network density also results in
the increase of the probability of access for all LAA links.
We compare the admitted traffics for different slices under
different average channel access probability for the UEs in
Figures 5 and 6. We observe that allowing MNOs to jointly
access licensed and unlicensed bands can significantly
increase the traffic volume admitted for all the supported
services. Interestingly, we can observe that the portion of the
admitted traffic for type 1 service decreases with the channel
access probability in unlicensed band. This is because the
unlicensed band is free and hence when the channel access
probability becomes high, it is more economic for MNOs to
offload traffic from licensed band to unlicensed band.
In Figures 7 and 8, we fix the minimum throughput that
needs to be guaranteed for type 2 service to η2i = 20 Mbps
and compare traffic volumes admitted by network slicing
under different throughput guarantees for type 1 service. We
observe that the traffic admitted by type 2 service decreases
with the minimum throughput requirement of type 1 service.
This is because the MNOs tend to obtain more benefit from
the services with a higher requirement. Therefore, when the
minimum throughput required by type 1 service increases
from 10Mbps to 100Mbps, both MNOs will distribute more
resources to the slice that supports type 1 service.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the inter-operator network slicing
over licensed and unlicensed bands. We develop
inter-operator spectrum aggregation method for licensed
band slicing and a right sharing concept for licensed band
slicing between MNOs. The inter-operator network slicing
problem has then been formulated as an overlapping
coalition formation game. We develop a distributed
optimization algorithm based on D-ADMM-PVS to
implement inter-operator network slicing. To evaluate the
practical performance of our proposed framework, we
develop a C++-based discrete-event simulator. We also
employed the real distribution of BSs deployed by two
cellular MNOs to simulate the possible implementation of
inter-operator network slicing in an urban city environment.
Our numerical results show that our proposed network
slicing framework significantly increases the admitted traffics
for all supported services.
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